From Passion to Profit: The Rise of Private Equity in Football

The ownership of football clubs is evolving. Where the majority of clubs have long been controlled by wealthy individuals injecting hundreds of millions of pounds to see their team succeed on both the domestic and global stage, that model is now changing, with multiple entities diluting power, decisions and, ultimately, spending. One group that could be a significant contributor to this shift is private equity. Before 2000, it was unusual for PE firms to hold any control or ownership of football clubs; but as the sport has grown in popularity, so has the opportunity to turn a profit. Chelsea's 2017/18 accounts recorded a then-record £62 million post-tax profit.¹ Given the explosion in football's popularity, it was perhaps unavoidable that private equity would eventually want a stake.

Chelsea: a club or an investment?

One key example is Chelsea FC. Located in west London, it is one of the capital's biggest clubs alongside the likes of Arsenal and Tottenham Hotspur.

Chelsea was previously owned by Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich who, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and his financial links to Russian president Vladimir Putin, was forced by the UK government to sell his majority stake. This led to the 2022 takeover of Chelsea by a consortium led by Todd Boehly (an American businessman) and Clearlake Capital (a Californian PE firm) for £4.25bn.² While Clearlake holds the majority stake, Boehly serves as chairman of the club's holding company.

After the acquisition, the fanbase has been divided over whether the takeover has benefited the club. On one hand, spending on transfers has surged under the new ownership. In the 2024/25 financial year the club spent £305.5 million on new player registrations, against the £118.0 million it invested in the playing squad in 2021/22, Abramovich's final season.³ While most signings under the new regime carry significantly higher fees, they are also tied to longer contracts that spread the payments over more years. Enzo Fernández, who joined in January 2023 for £106.8 million, was signed on a contract of more than eight years.⁴

On the other hand, that spending has come at a cost. The club has run heavy losses throughout, and has stayed within PSR in part by booking profits on sales of assets to other companies within its own ownership group, rather than by narrowing the gap in the football business. UEFA has been less accommodating: in July 2025 Chelsea were fined €20 million for breaching its football earnings rule, with a further sum of more than £50 million payable if the club fails to comply over a four-year period.⁵

The 2024/25 figures are stark: a £262.4 million pre-tax loss, the largest ever recorded by an English club, set against a £128.4 million profit the year before.⁶

Despite Chelsea's losses in recent years, its growing revenue and potential to achieve profitability could make the club enticing to private equity firms. PE investors often seek long-term returns, particularly where there are opportunities to improve operational efficiency, reduce costs and increase commercial revenues. Chelsea's global brand, large international fanbase and significant revenue-generating potential could therefore make it an attractive investment despite its historic losses.

AC Milan: profit in exchange for performance

On the subject of reducing the cost of running a football club, another significant club to have shifted ownership towards private equity is AC Milan. Based in Milan, Italy, the club is renowned for its rivalry with Inter Milan and for its success in the late 1980s and early 2000s, fielding greats of the game such as Marco van Basten and Kaká. Previously owned by the American hedge fund Elliott Management, the club was sold to American investment firm RedBird Capital for €1.2 billion in August 2022.⁷ This move from a hedge fund to a private investment firm is symbolic of a broader wave of American capital entering football and shifting clubs' priorities towards financial sustainability.

Since the takeover, the club has not enjoyed the sporting resurgence it hoped for. Silverware has been thin, limited to the Supercoppa Italiana won in January 2025. The team was eliminated at the Champions League play-off stage in 2024/25 and, after finishing eighth in Serie A that season, played no European football at all in 2025/26. It has also been consistently outperformed by fierce rivals Inter, who have won two of the last three Serie A titles, completed a domestic double in 2025/26 and reached two Champions League finals in three seasons.

Financially, however, the picture is very different. In 2021/22, Elliott's final year, the club lost roughly €66.5 million.⁸ It has since posted three successive years of profit: €6.1 million in 2022/23, €4.1 million in 2023/24 and €3 million in 2024/25.⁹

Is private equity the future of football ownership?

As to whether the trend will continue, football's growing global popularity is likely to create further opportunities for clubs to increase revenues, attract larger audiences and expand their international supporter bases. As a result, clubs may continue to be valued at ever-higher prices, potentially making the industry more attractive to private equity firms seeking to capitalise on that growth.

This aligns neatly with the core logic of the private equity model: acquire an asset, implement strategies to increase its value, and ultimately exit the investment at a significant profit. In future, we may therefore see PE firms increasingly target smaller clubs, invest substantial capital to improve their sporting and commercial performance, and eventually sell them at a higher valuation, realising a significant return.

Final thoughts

If you support a club and cherish the traditions and competition of the game, the rise of private equity ownership can be viewed as both a blessing and a curse. On one hand, PE investment can improve a club's financial sustainability through cost discipline, professionalised operations and stronger revenue generation. On the other, financial success does not necessarily translate into success on the pitch. If cost-cutting and profit maximisation come at the expense of investment in the squad, a lack of domestic and international success may erode the very reasons supporters engage with the sport in the first place.

Over time, persistent underperformance could weaken the emotional bond between fans and their club, particularly if supporters feel that commercial interests are being prioritised over sporting ambition and the club's traditional identity. Which brings us to the underlying question.

Is profit a reason for football failure?

Perhaps that is something every football fan should consider.