When Bosnians voted on 4th October, they mostly stuck with the people already in charge. Željka Cvijanović of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) held the Serb seat in the three-member presidency with 55.6% of the vote in the official count, and Denis Bećirović of the Social Democrats held the Bosniak seat with 38.1%.1 Only the Croat seat changed hands. After two consecutive terms for Željko Komšić, it passed to Darijana Filipović of the nationalist HDZ BiH, a party that had long claimed Komšić was not a legitimate representative of Croats.2 Fewer people took part than last time. About 44% of voters turned out,1 down from roughly 50% in 2022,3 a sign that many Bosnians no longer expect elections to change much.

Milorad Dodik came out of the election stronger than anyone, even though he was not standing. The SNSD leader was convicted in 2025 of defying decisions by the international High Representative, and he is banned from public office. That did not stop him campaigning. At his final rally in Banja Luka he told the crowd that "Bosnia and Herzegovina is dead; it is an impossible country".4 Five days before the vote, he had been in Moscow for his eleventh meeting with Vladimir Putin since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine began.5 His party's candidate, Savo Minić, then took the presidency of Republika Srpska once his main rival had conceded.6

Brussels replied on 6th October. In a joint statement, Kaja Kallas, the EU's foreign policy chief, and Marta Kos, the Enlargement Commissioner, urged the winners to form governments at every level "without delay" and repeated the EU's commitment to Bosnia's European perspective "as a single, united and sovereign country".7 The words were familiar, and so was the lack of progress. EU leaders agreed to open accession talks in March 2024, yet more than two and a half years later the first intergovernmental conference, the meeting that would formally start them, has still not taken place.8

So, does the result lock in Moscow-friendly obstruction, or is the EU's slow and cautious offer part of the problem? This article will argue that it is both, and that the EU can still pull Bosnia west, but not by waiting for Bosnia's leaders to move first.

What Did Bosnians Actually Vote For?

On the surface, this was a vote for nationalism. In the race for the Republika Srpska assembly, the SNSD won about 39% of the vote,9 and on election night Dodik told supporters: "No one should ask us to change our politics."4 In the Federation, the SDA increased its share of the vote and HDZ BiH held its ground.3

However, this was not a vote against Europe. In the latest survey for the state's Directorate for European Integration, carried out during April and May, 74.4% of Bosnians said they would vote for EU membership: 86.1% in the Federation, but only 54.1% in Republika Srpska.10 The electorate, clearly, wants Europe in the abstract and votes, in practice, for parties that slow it down, because an ethnic system rewards voting to protect one's own group rather than for reform.

The low turnout can also be considered. The Academy of Sciences and Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina estimates that the population fell from 3.53 million in 2013 to about 2.9 million in 2023, and that more than half of people of Bosnian origin now live abroad.11 Many of the voters most likely to punish the status quo have already left the country. As one Tuzla activist explained before the vote, "I don't think these new elections in Bosnia will change anything."4

What Makes Bosnia's Leaders the Problem?

The strongest argument is that Brussels is not the obstacle; Banja Luka is. Delays in submitting the Reform Agenda, which unlocks money from the EU's Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, cost Bosnia €108.5m, a 10% cut, in July 2025.12 The Commission now warns that another €373.9m will be lost for good if the first 50 reform steps are not completed by 31st December. Its other demands are relatively modest: two judicial laws and a chief negotiator with a full mandate, all of which the Commission says are still needed.8

Dodik, meanwhile, has voiced his priorities. In Moscow he promised "We will not allow sanctions against Russia" and said Bosnia would not introduce visas for Russian citizens, while Putin, according to the Republika Srpska broadcaster RTRS, said: "We do not want foreign influence to be decisive."5

He also has less reason than before to fear the West. On 29th October 2025 the US Treasury removed 48 people and companies, Dodik among them, from its sanctions list, with the State Department citing "constructive actions" by the Republika Srpska assembly.13 Dodik now claims he told the Trump administration during those talks: "Get rid of this Schmidt", meaning the German High Representative, Christian Schmidt. Dodik later conceded he did not think US officials had listened to him directly, and offered no evidence. Schmidt, who announced his resignation in May, has since said he faced unexpected pressure from Washington to leave early.14 Since 1st July the office has been run by an acting High Representative, the American diplomat Louis Crishock, as its overseers cannot agree on a successor.15 The Atlantic Council reported that US officials want the next High Representative to have a more limited mandate, while the Europeans want one who will keep pressing for reform.16 On this reading, no EU offer could outbid a patron in Moscow and a lenient Washington.

Is the EU the Problem?

The opposing argument holds that the EU has made obstruction cheap. Vedran Džihić of the Austrian Institute for International Affairs says enlargement has "effectively become a non-process" and that the EU has "remained passive, reactive, and hesitant"; Bosnia's preparedness score barely moved, from 1.67 to 1.7 on a scale of one to five, leaving it the weakest performer in the Western Balkans.17 Jovana Marović, writing for the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, argues that "The EU frequently prioritizes short-term (geopolitical) stability over long-term democratic transformation", and that its response to the arrest warrant for Dodik was largely symbolic, with no funding suspended.18 The UK still sanctions Dodik, and the US did until October 2025, but the EU as a bloc never has, because Hungary and Croatia blocked it.2

Bosnia is also being left behind. Montenegro has opened all 33 negotiating chapters, provisionally closed 21, and aims to join in 2028.19 On 6th October the Commission proposed up to 15 years of safeguards after accession for future members, and promised accession roadmaps for Montenegro, Albania, Moldova and Ukraine.20 Bosnia is not on that list. The European Council on Foreign Relations warns that open-ended "gradual integration offers deepening ties but no guaranteed closure", and that inaction leaves a vacuum while Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf states expand their footprint in the region.21 For a Bosnian voter, membership is distant and conditional; Dodik's patrons deliver now.

The fair response is that the EU's conditions are hardly onerous, and that its slowness is mostly a response to obstruction rather than its cause. Montenegro shows that reform is rewarded. But a process with no visible end gives voters little reason to punish the leaders who stall it.

The Fair Verdict

Those who blame Bosnia's leaders are right about the cause. The main brake on Bosnia's European path is domestic: the SNSD's veto power, Croat nationalist demands for electoral change and a political class that profits from the deadlock. The EU cannot make those choices for Bosnia, and the election confirmed the parties that make them.

However, the EU's critics are right about the incentives. Brussels has trimmed funds without stopping them, avoided sanctions, and issued statements that condemn obstruction without naming who is responsible. That has turned the status quo into the safest option for Bosnia's elites.

So, can the EU still pull Bosnia west? Yes, but only if it uses the leverage it still has. Around three in four Bosnians want to join, almost €1bn in Growth Plan money is still available,8 and with Viktor Orbán gone, EU governments can no longer hide behind Hungary's veto, which leaves Croatia's objection as the one to answer.2 The tests are near. Will the outgoing government complete the 50 reform steps before the 31st December deadline, and will its successor appoint a chief negotiator and pass the two judicial laws? And will the EU name the obstructors, send money around them to municipalities and civil society, and secure a High Representative with a full mandate? If both occur, the status quo can still be broken. If not, Bosnia will not choose Moscow so much as drift towards it by default.

Footnotes

  1. Klix.ba (Central Election Commission data), Rezultati Općih izbora 2026. u BiH (opens in a new tab), 25th October 2026. 2

  2. European Policy Centre, Bosnian elections 2026: How Dodik won without running (opens in a new tab), 12th October 2026. 2 3

  3. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Bosnia and Herzegovina has voted and remains trapped in the status quo (opens in a new tab), 16th October 2026. 2

  4. Al Jazeera, Banned Bosnian Serb leader Dodik declares party victory in election (opens in a new tab), 4th October 2026. 2 3

  5. European Western Balkans, Dodik meets Putin in Moscow (opens in a new tab), 30th September 2026. 2

  6. European Western Balkans, What are the preliminary results of BiH’s general elections? (opens in a new tab), 5th October 2026.

  7. European External Action Service, BiH: Joint statement by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas and Commissioner Kos on the general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (opens in a new tab), 6th October 2026.

  8. N1, EU issues urgent reform warning to Bosnia following general elections threatening loss of €373.9 million (opens in a new tab), 8th October 2026. 2 3

  9. Klix.ba (Central Election Commission data), Narodna skupština Republike Srpske (opens in a new tab), 25th October 2026.

  10. Sarajevo Times, Soreca: Support of BiH Citizens for EU Membership Sends a Strong Message to Political Actors (opens in a new tab), 13th June 2026.

  11. N1, Bosnia's population has shrunk by 18% since 2013 (opens in a new tab), 29th July 2025.

  12. N1, EU cuts BiH's Growth Plan funds by €108.5 million over reform delays (opens in a new tab), 17th July 2025.

  13. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, US Removes Pro-Russian Bosnian Serb Politician Milorad Dodik And Allies From Sanctions List (opens in a new tab), 29th October 2025.

  14. European Western Balkans, Dodik claims he sought Schmidt’s removal in talks with Trump administration over sanctions (opens in a new tab), 12th October 2026.

  15. Office of the High Representative, Statement of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (opens in a new tab), 30th June 2026.

  16. Atlantic Council, Bosnia’s high representative succession dispute exposes a deeper transatlantic rift (opens in a new tab), 19th August 2026.

  17. European Western Balkans (from the BiEPAG blog), Bosnia and the EU enlargement report – A non-event in a non-process (opens in a new tab), 7th November 2025.

  18. Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, From Norms to Noise: Why the EU Talks Reform but Fuels Decline in the Balkans (opens in a new tab), June 2025.

  19. European Western Balkans, Maida Gorčević: Work on all 33 negotiating chapters has been completed (opens in a new tab), 23rd October 2026.

  20. EUobserver, Commission seeks 15-year safeguards on future member states, but says reforms won't create two-tier EU (opens in a new tab), 6th October 2026.

  21. European Council on Foreign Relations, Accelerate the accessions: Why faster is better in EU enlargement policy (opens in a new tab), 18th December 2025.