On 15th October, CNN reported that Ukraine had run out of Patriot interceptors, the American-made missiles that are its main defence against Russian ballistic missiles. In the attack on 14th October, Ukraine's Air Force said it had intercepted just four ballistic missiles.1 A few days later, on a video call with US senators, Volodymyr Zelensky said Pete Hegseth, the US defence secretary, had deliberately held back sign-off on Patriot interceptors and on the AIM-9X missiles used by Ukraine's NASAMS air-defence systems, leaving Kyiv with almost no American interceptors. "All of this suggests that some political decision has been made to slow down support for us," he said.2
Much of what Kyiv was waiting for had already been paid for. According to a Washington Post report on 19th October, interceptors funded by European governments were stuck because Hegseth had neither rejected the transfers nor signed the documents needed to approve them. Zelensky says monthly US deliveries have fallen to about twelve missiles, a quarter of the previous rate.3
The hold has outlasted the outcry. On 26th October Zelensky wrote that Kyiv had been "waiting for nearly a month for Mr. Hegseth to sign off on missiles for Patriots and NASAMS".4 Overnight on 27th October Russia launched sixteen ballistic missiles, and in his address that evening Zelensky said more than one hundred had been fired at Kyiv and the surrounding region since 14th October. "And above all, we do not have enough missiles for Patriots," he said.5 By 29th October, NATO allies told Euronews they doubted Ukraine would get the interceptors before the US midterm elections on 3rd November. One NATO source said Donald Trump "is using as much leverage as he has over Ukraine ahead of the midterms".6 The elections have now passed, but on 6th November Washington had still not approved the deliveries. "We have the funding, now we need the stocks to be delivered to Ukraine," said Antti Häkkänen, Finland's defence minister.7
Even Washington's approval of new missiles shows how little there is to go round. On 30th October the State Department approved a potential $2.1bn sale of 500 PAC-3 MSE interceptors to Ukraine, which Canada, Germany and Norway are expected to fund alongside Ukrainian money backed by an EU loan, with no US government funding involved. Zelensky called it "a substantial number" but warned that deliveries might begin only "in a few years".8 A State Department official later put the estimated delivery window at between the last quarter of 2030 and the last quarter of 2033.9
On 22nd October, in the middle of all this, Lockheed Martin, which makes the PAC-3 MSE interceptor, reported a record backlog of $292.0bn. That includes $52.5bn linked to a multi-year contract to produce PAC-3 missiles, and sales at its Missiles and Fire Control division were up 24% on a year earlier.10 In the same fortnight, the country that most urgently needed air-defence missiles could not get them, and the company that makes them announced its largest order backlog ever.
In most markets that would be odd: a seller with full order books and buyers ready to pay would simply trade. The arms market works differently, because the US government stands between Lockheed and its foreign customers and decides who is served first. This article asks whether Washington can ration its most sought-after weapons and still keep its dominant share of Europe's rearmament. It argues that it can in the short term, because Europe has few alternatives, but that every act of rationing raises the price Europeans place on supplies they control themselves. In the long run the United States keeps the market only by sharing production.
Why Are Patriot Missiles So Scarce?
The first reason is a demand shock. In July, analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimated that fewer than six months of war with Iran had used up nearly two-thirds of America's Patriot interceptors, leaving roughly 759 to 827.11 Ukraine, the Gulf states and America's own forces were suddenly drawing on the same small pool. The CSIS analysts were blunt: "There are no good alternatives to Patriot and THAAD for ballistic missile defense."11
The economics of using them are also brutal. Each Patriot interceptor costs about $4m, while an Iranian Shahed-136 attack drone costs roughly $50,000 to make.11 Attackers can afford to fire cheap weapons in volume, so defenders use up their expensive stocks faster than they can replace them.
The second reason is that supply responds slowly. In 2025 Lockheed delivered 620 PAC-3 MSE interceptors. In January it agreed a framework with the Pentagon to raise output to 2,000 a year, but over seven years.12 Economists call this inelastic supply: when demand jumps, output barely moves in the short run, because new production lines need specialised machine tools, rocket motors, qualified suppliers and trained workers, all of which take years to put in place.
The bottlenecks are physical. The Foreign Policy Research Institute, cited by Defense News, estimates that an interceptor takes two years to build and its solid rocket motor two and a half, while every missile's seeker comes from one Boeing factory in Huntsville, Alabama. Defense News adds that the factory made only 650 to 700 seekers last year, and that the United States fired 1,060 to 1,430 Patriots against Iran this year,13 well above the 620 PAC-3 MSE interceptors Lockheed delivered in 2025.
Firms are also reluctant to build that capacity without a guaranteed buyer. A missile factory built for a war that ends early sits idle, and only one customer, the state, can legally buy what it makes. That is why the Pentagon's answer has been long contracts. On 29th July the Pentagon awarded Lockheed up to $53.86bn for PAC-3 MSE production, taking the seven-year multi-year deal to $58.62bn. The company said it would triple capacity by the end of 2030. Michael Duffey, the under secretary of war for acquisition and sustainment, said the award gave industry "the long-term demand signals it needs".14 On 14th October Lockheed followed with a $300m expansion of its Grand Prairie plant in Texas. It expects to add 6,000 jobs nationwide, 2,000 of them in Texas, and has committed $8bn to $9bn to munitions investment through 2030.15
This moves risk from the company to the taxpayer. If demand falls, the government still pays, so the firm can afford to invest. That makes sense when shortages are dangerous, but it means relief arrives only gradually. Most of the extra capacity is due between now and 2030, which leaves the next few years as the period in which interceptors are scarcest. Ukraine's new order shows what that means in practice: missiles approved in 2026 are not expected before late 2030.9 Scarcity is also profitable. In the third quarter Lockheed's missiles division earned an operating margin of 14.0%, against 9.0% for the aeronautics division that builds the F-35.10 Shortages, though, do not decide which countries go without. Washington does.
Who Decides Who Gets Them?
A Patriot missile is not bought like a car. As a Lockheed spokesperson put it in 2025, "Foreign military sales are government-to-government transactions."16 Foreign buyers sign with the US government, which sets the order of delivery in line with its own priorities, not according to who pays most or who signed first.
Europe has tried to work within that system. In its first year, twenty-nine countries joined the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), a NATO scheme through which allies buy American weapons for Ukraine, and contributions reached $6.7bn, according to Ukraine's defence ministry. The ministry says around 95% of the Patriot interceptors Ukraine receives arrive this way.17 Paying, however, has not guaranteed delivery. On 23rd March, months before the current hold, the Pentagon told Congress it intended to redirect about $750m of PURL money to refill American stocks instead, according to the Washington Post.18 Europeans also cannot pass on Patriots from their own inventories without Washington's approval.3 On 27th October Zelensky urged Hegseth to approve the transfer of twenty-three Patriot missiles from allied countries, saying that Hegseth may believe he has signed every document, "but it is not so."19
The administration denies changing course. "Nothing has changed," Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on 20th October, adding: "When a country doesn't get interceptors from the United States, it's not because they're denied." Instead, he said: "We have minimum standards that we have to meet internally in our base presence all over the world."20 Hegseth, too, pointed to the need to preserve American interceptor stocks.21 And on 30th October NATO's top commander, General Alexus Grynkewich, insisted that deliveries were continuing: "Every single third-party transfer that has been requested of the U.S. government has been approved."22
That defence deserves to be taken seriously. When there is not enough of something, it has to be rationed somehow. If interceptors went to the highest bidder, the richest Gulf states could outbid a cash-strapped Ukraine. They are already in the queue. In early May, about two months into the war with Iran, Washington approved a $4.01bn package to refill Qatar's Patriot stocks, one of about $8.6bn of arms sales to Israel, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE pushed through under emergency powers.23 Washington also has troops in the Gulf whom the missiles protect, so a government that rations by strategic priority is, arguably, behaving more responsibly than a free market would.
The trouble is that buyers cannot predict that rationing. Ukraine is not the only customer to have found itself further down the queue. In March, the Swiss government said the Patriot system it had ordered could arrive as much as five years late, because Washington had moved Ukraine up the delivery queue the year before. Bern is now looking at a second air-defence system and wants a solution by summer 2027 at the latest.24
For a buyer, a weapon that might not arrive when it is needed is worth less than one that will, even if it performs better. Governments are now starting to pay what might be called a sovereignty premium for supplies they control, accepting higher costs or slower delivery in return for certainty.
Germany shows the more constructive version of that instinct. In September, the defence minister, Boris Pistorius, pressed Washington to let PAC-3 MSE missiles be built in Germany, arguing that it would help ease the world's shortage of air-defence missiles. Whether it happens, Defense News added, depends largely on Washington and Lockheed "playing along".25 In October, Jason Reynolds, who heads Lockheed's integrated air and missile defence business, said that if the company explored production in Germany it would probably work "with a company like Diehl". He also said Lockheed was "absolutely willing" to talk to Ukraine, possibly starting with the ACE variant, which Defense News says costs half as much as the MSE. But he added: "We at Lockheed don't have the authority to just build factories wherever we want."26 Berlin is not asking to stop buying American, only to make the missiles closer to home.
In Europe, Washington has so far shared work on PAC-3, Lockheed's own missile, but not the factory. In late October Poland was chosen to host a PAC-3 servicing centre worth about €227m, which Euronews reports will be the only such facility outside the United States. American authorities picked the location, and the centre will service missiles rather than build them.27 Lockheed, which welcomed the decision on 27th October, says the site will repair, refurbish and recertify interceptors for NATO allies. "Lockheed Martin is a permanent part of Europe's security landscape," said Jay Pitman, president of Lockheed Martin International.28
Licences to make Patriot missiles are not unheard of. Japan and Germany already hold them,29 Germany's MBDA builds the older PAC-2,25 and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries makes roughly thirty PAC-3s a year under licence from Lockheed.30 For Ukraine, however, Washington has held back. At the NATO summit in Turkey on 8th July, Trump told Ukraine: "We are gonna give a license to you to make Patriots." By 31st July he had changed his tone: "We have not agreed to that. We're talking about it, but it's a hard thing to give away that kind of technology."29 From an economic point of view, a licence is a decision to share a monopoly. It would add supply, but it would also hand over technology and future market share. Even if one were granted, the long build times would mean the first missiles arrived years later.13 So a licence is a remedy for the next shortage, not this one.
Is Europe Really Turning Away from American Weapons?
The headline figures say Europe is buying more American, not less. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), European arms imports in the five years from 2021 to 2025 were 210% higher than in the five years from 2016 to 2020. The United States accounted for 58% of the arms imported by NATO's European members and 42% of arms exports worldwide.31 Russia's invasion of Ukraine pushed Europe into America's catalogue because American kit was available and proven.
The F-35 is where hedging is clearest. Spain ruled out ordering the jet in August 2025, preferring the Eurofighter and a future European fighter.16 Canada's review of its eighty-eight-jet order, launched in March 2025, still had no end date this April, even after the US ambassador, Pete Hoekstra, warned that backing out could put the NORAD partnership at risk.32 In early October, Politico reported that Britain had opened exploratory talks with Germany about a role in GCAP, the British-Italian-Japanese fighter programme, after Berlin and Paris abandoned their joint fighter.33 On 8th October the prime minister, Andy Burnham, said he had told the German chancellor of "our openness to Germany joining GCAP".34 Cost is squeezing orders too. In March, Switzerland abandoned its target of thirty-six F-35s and now expects about thirty, because buying the full fleet would have needed another 1.1bn francs.24 Lockheed's own figures show the strain. F-35 deliveries in the first nine months of 2026 were 94, down from 143. Costs on the Lot 20 contract had begun to exceed the authorisation and funding agreed so far, which the company warns will hurt future results unless more is approved.10
The other side of the ledger is just as real. In October 2025, Denmark announced it would buy sixteen more F-35s, taking its planned fleet to forty-three.35 Britain's Defence Investment Plan confirmed the RAF's first F-35As, so that it can join NATO's nuclear-sharing Dual Capable Aircraft mission.36 The reason is what economists call switching costs and network effects. Once an air force has trained its pilots, built its maintenance chain and joined NATO's nuclear mission around one aircraft, leaving is extremely expensive. Each extra ally that flies the F-35 makes the jet more useful to the others, because they can share spares, training and data. The commitment is also unusually long. The F-35 programme office puts the jet's lifetime cost at $2.1tn over a life cycle running from 1994 to 2088, around $1tn of it reflecting inflation.37 A country that buys the F-35 is buying decades of American spares, software and support, which ties it more tightly into the network but also deepens the dependence that the Patriot hold has made Europeans wary of. Europe is cutting its F-35 orders at the margins, not walking away from the jet.
Brussels is now turning that hedging into rules. Under the EU's Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan scheme, at least 65% of the cost of a system's components must come from the EU, the EEA-EFTA states or Ukraine.38 Washington has objected. "Only our enemies benefit when we lose focus on making sure we have the most effective weapons," Andrew Puzder, the US ambassador to the EU, said on 30th September, arguing that "capability and availability should determine the solution, not geography."39
That argument cuts both ways. Availability is precisely what the Patriot hold put in doubt. Europe is also building the capacity to test it. MBDA, whose Aster missile arms SAMP/T, described by Defense News as the only European alternative to Patriot, plans to double Aster output in 2026 and ended 2025 with a record €44.4bn order backlog.40 Washington is responding with deregulation. The State Department's proposed rewrite of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), open for comment until 30th November, aims to "promote U.S. industry participation in a range of international supply chains" by freeing common parts such as knobs, tyres and hinges from control.41
The Fair Verdict
Can America ration its missiles and keep Europe's market? In the short term, yes. CSIS's verdict that there are no good alternatives to Patriot and THAAD still holds, Europe's own production is only beginning to scale up, and the F-35 is protected by switching costs no budget cycle can easily overcome. Lockheed's $292.0bn backlog is unlikely to shrink any time soon.
In the long term, the answer depends on whether Washington learns the right lesson. The fair criticism is not that the United States rations. Any seller facing a shortage must, and a government protecting its own troops has a reasonable claim to go first. The criticism is that it rations unpredictably, against missiles allies have already paid for, and, allies fear, with one eye on domestic politics. Each time that happens, the sovereignty premium rises, and EU rules such as SAFE's component requirement help lock it in. A buyer who has been left waiting once will pay more next time for a supply it can be sure of.
The economically sensible answer is the one Berlin has already proposed: build American designs in Europe. Licensed PAC-3 production would add the capacity the world is short of, keep American systems at the heart of European arsenals and give Europeans the security of supply they are effectively paying for. The Polish servicing centre shows Washington can share work when it chooses to, and Japan's licensed PAC-3 line shows it can share production; the test is whether it will do the same in Europe. For Lockheed, that means giving up some work and some control. The alternative is to watch European governments pay more for Asters and Eurofighters because they can rely on getting them.
America can keep Europe's arms market, but only if it starts treating European buyers as partners in production rather than customers at the back of the queue.
Footnotes
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Defence Industry Europe, Ukraine's Patriot interceptor stocks exhausted, leaving defenses exposed to Russian ballistic missile attacks, CNN reports (opens in a new tab), 15th October 2026.
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Axios, Zelensky lobbies senators to press White House on alleged intel and weapons curbs (opens in a new tab), 19th October 2026.
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ThePrint, Trump admin 'withholding' approval for Europe-funded Patriot missiles for Ukraine—WaPo report (opens in a new tab), 20th October 2026. 2
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Euronews, Zelenskyy calls out monthlong wait for Hegseth to sign off on Patriot missiles (opens in a new tab), 26th October 2026.
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Euromaidan Press, "Above all, we do not have enough missiles for Patriots"—Zelenskyy after 100+ ballistic missiles (opens in a new tab), 28th October 2026.
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Euronews, NATO allies fear Trump will delay Patriot missiles for Ukraine until after US midterms (opens in a new tab), 29th October 2026.
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Euronews, Exclusive: US is 'playing politics' with Patriot missiles - Finnish minister (opens in a new tab), 6th November 2026.
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The Defense Post, US Approves Potential $2.1B Sale of 500 Patriot Interceptors to Ukraine (opens in a new tab), 2nd November 2026.
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European Pravda, European Pravda learns when US will deliver 500 Patriot missiles to Ukraine (opens in a new tab), 2nd November 2026. 2
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Lockheed Martin, Lockheed Martin Reports Third Quarter 2026 Financial Results (opens in a new tab), 22nd October 2026. 2 3
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Stars and Stripes, Iran war has consumed nearly 67% of US Patriot interceptor stockpile, report says (opens in a new tab), 30th July 2026. 2 3
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The Aviationist, Lockheed Martin to Bring PAC-3 MSE Interceptor's Production to 2,000 per Year (opens in a new tab), 6th January 2026.
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Defense News, Ukraine can soon build its own Patriots – but it could take years (opens in a new tab), 10th July 2026. 2
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Lockheed Martin, Department of War Awards Lockheed Martin $58.62B for Multiyear PAC-3 MSE Production to Strengthen the Arsenal of Freedom (opens in a new tab), 29th July 2026.
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Lockheed Martin, Lockheed Martin Expands Advanced Munitions Manufacturing in Texas, Driving Thousands of New American Jobs (opens in a new tab), 14th October 2026.
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Breaking Defense, Spain rules out F-35 order, prioritizes Eurofighter and FCAS (opens in a new tab), 6th August 2025. 2
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Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, A year of PURL: nearly $7 billion for deliveries of critical weapons to Ukraine (opens in a new tab), 23rd July 2026.
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European Pravda, WP: Pentagon considers redirecting weapons meant for Ukraine to Middle East (opens in a new tab), 26th March 2026.
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Hromadske, Zelenskyy urges Hegseth to approve transfer of 23 Patriot missiles to Ukraine (opens in a new tab), 28th October 2026.
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HNGN, Pentagon Holds Europe-Paid Patriots for Ukraine; Rubio: 'Nothing Has Changed' (opens in a new tab), 20th October 2026.
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Kyiv Post, Trump Demands Zelensky 'Make a Deal' as Republican Senator Says Putin Is Playing Him 'Like a Fiddle' (opens in a new tab), 21st October 2026.
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The Kyiv Independent, US approves $2.1 billion Patriot missile sale to Ukraine as Zelensky warns of years-long wait for deliveries (opens in a new tab), 30th October 2026.
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Breaking Defense, US clears $8.6 billion arms sales to Middle East countries, 'waiving' congressional review (opens in a new tab), 4th May 2026.
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blue News, Switzerland to Buy Fewer F-35s: Federal Council Confirms Reduction in Fighter Jets (opens in a new tab), 6th March 2026. 2
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Defense News, Germany wants to manufacture American PAC-3 interceptors to help meet global demand (opens in a new tab), 23rd September 2026. 2
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Defense News, Lockheed eyes fresh PAC-3 interceptor production options for Ukraine, Europe (opens in a new tab), 13th October 2026.
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Euronews, Poland chosen to host €227m Patriot missile maintenance centre (opens in a new tab), 28th October 2026.
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Lockheed Martin, Lockheed Martin Welcomes Dedicated PAC-3® Missile Maintenance Facility In Poland (opens in a new tab), 27th October 2026.
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The Kyiv Independent, 'We have not agreed to that' — Trump walks back promise of Patriot licenses for Ukraine (opens in a new tab), 31st July 2026. 2
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Euromaidan Press, Japan builds the missiles Ukraine needs most—its own rules forbid the handoff (opens in a new tab), 10th July 2026.
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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Global arms flows jump nearly 10 per cent as European demand soars (opens in a new tab), 9th March 2026.
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AeroTime, Canada's F-35 review drags on with no decision timeline (opens in a new tab), 28th April 2026.
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AirData News, UK opens talks with Germany over possible role in GCAP fighter program (opens in a new tab), 5th October 2026.
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Al Jazeera, UK's Burnham 'open' to Germany joining GCAP fighter jet programme (opens in a new tab), 8th October 2026.
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Overt Defense, Denmark Orders 16 More F-35 Fighter Jets (opens in a new tab), 23rd October 2025.
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Defence Industry Europe, UK Defence Investment Plan confirms new F-35 batch with first F-35As to strengthen RAF combat air capability (opens in a new tab), 5th July 2026.
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Air & Space Forces Magazine, F-35 Office Seeks to Clarify $2.1 Trillion Cost Ahead of Budget Release (opens in a new tab), 8th April 2025.
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Defence Industry Europe, European Union adopts €150 billion SAFE instrument for joint defence procurement (opens in a new tab), 27th May 2025.
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Euronews, US ambassador slams EU's 'Buy European' weapons push as 'self-interest' (opens in a new tab), 30th September 2026.
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Defense News, MBDA to double Aster air-defense missile output in 2026 (opens in a new tab), 26th March 2026.
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DLA Piper, Department of State proposes ITAR revisions: Top points (opens in a new tab), 7th October 2026.