Dubai Tower, a Chinese container ship, left Qingdao in August and reached Felixstowe twenty-four days later, having gone through the Arctic rather than the Red Sea. Proceeding through Suez, or the longer way around the Cape of Good Hope, usually takes forty days or more.1 The voyage was part of a busy season. By 30th September the Centre for High North Logistics (CHNL), a Norwegian research centre that tracks Arctic shipping, had counted 104 full transits of Russia's Northern Sea Route, against 103 in the whole of 2025 and 97 in 2024.2 The Financial Times uses a wider count of voyages on the route, and by its measure September set a record of 133, more than four times the 2022 level.1

Russian officials say the growth has continued since. According to the state news agency TASS, Alexei Chekunkov, the minister for the Far East and the Arctic, said on 11th November that transit cargo had reached six million tonnes by early November, double the figure a year earlier.3 The same week brought a much cooler forecast: a report by Systemiq projected that trans-Arctic shipping would carry under 0.2% of the value of world seaborne trade in 2050.4

Those two numbers pull in opposite directions, and between them sits the question this route keeps raising. Is the Arctic becoming a real trade route, or is it a summer curiosity?

Why Ships Are Heading North

Trouble in the Gulf may explain some of the traffic. Lloyd's List Intelligence reports that US forces are still blockading Iranian ports, and that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz slowed during the spell of intense Iranian attacks in October, when ships without Iranian links averaged 121 transits a week from 5th to 25th October, compared with 132 in the three weeks before.5 Shipping analysts would call any resulting shift north rerouting. When war pushes up the risk and the insurance cost of the usual routes, an awkward alternative that never used to pay starts to look reasonable.

The change that looks more sustainable originates from China. ArcticToday reported in August that at least six Chinese operators had planned summer voyages, with about 20,000 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent units) of capacity between them, and that Felixstowe, Hamburg and Rotterdam had joined the network. It estimated that a run from Shanghai to Rotterdam saves fifteen days on Suez and twenty-five on the Cape.6 One of those operators, Sea Legend, scheduled eight weekly sailings from Ningbo-Zhoushan and other Chinese ports, and preliminary figures from the provincial authorities in Zhejiang put the exports it carried at more than 14,000 TEU.7

Russian crude is the final part of the picture. In the first eight months of 2026 twelve tankers carried more than ten million barrels of Russian Arctic oil to Chinese buyers, and Reuters reported that China is currently the only buyer of Russian oil shipped along the route.8 CHNL estimates that transit cargo of all kinds had reached 3.7 million tonnes by the end of September, 15% more than the 3.2 million tonnes carried in all of 2025.2

A Rounding Error Next to Suez

None of these developments look large in comparison to Suez. In the four weeks to 27th September the canal averaged 287 transits a week,9 so a single ordinary week at Suez saw almost three times as many ships as the 104 transits the Northern Sea Route managed over the whole season.

The Arctic season also remains relatively short. Chinese authorities regard roughly July to October as the normal navigation window, and Sea Legend sent its last two ships out of Ningbo on 27th September, earlier than it had planned, because forecasts showed the ice spreading in October. It says it intends to resume the service next summer.7

The sums are not much better while the water is open. Bellona, a Norwegian environmental non-governmental organisation (NGO), reports that the South Korean ship PanStar Acro sailed from Busan to Felixstowe in twenty-one days without an icebreaker but could not attract European exports for the return trip and went home with 1,743 empty containers. Bellona also cites Korea Maritime Institute research suggesting that a container transit on the route can cost about 55% more than one through Suez, and mentions that some voyages on the Chinese service took about thirty days instead of the expected twenty.10

Scale works against the route as well. Container lines earn their money by running very large ships to fixed timetables all year. Istanbul Bridge, the largest ship in Sea Legend's fleet, carries 4,890 TEU,7 and the major lines, which depend on far bigger vessels, have kept away. "We do not and will not use the Northern Sea Route," Søren Toft, chief executive of the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), said in January.11

Moscow's own targets show how far short the route has fallen. A 2018 presidential decree called for 80 million tonnes of cargo a year by 2024 and 200 million by 2030. The consultancy Gecon put the actual figure for 2025 at 37.02 million tonnes, 2.3% down on the year before and the second annual fall in a row.12 Rosatom, Russia's state nuclear corporation, expects a record of more than 40 million tonnes in 2026,13 which would still only be half the 2024 target. Its forecast is also well above the independent estimates. Rosatom expects more than seven million tonnes of transit cargo this year, whereas CHNL expects a little over 4.5 million if most of the voyages under way at the end of September are completed, and gCaptain mentions that Rosatom's container figures have not been independently verified.13 As for the shorter distance, the Systemiq report, with economic modelling by a researcher at the University of Oxford, expects it to save the industry only about $100m a year in 2050, because ice-class ships, higher insurance, slower speeds and thin infrastructure eat into the gain.4

Whose Route Is It?

The route may be a sideshow for world trade. For Russia it is something else. The Bellona Environmental Transparency Center counted fifty shadow-fleet oil tankers on the route by mid-September, against thirty-eight in the whole 2025 season. About three-quarters of the oil tankers it observed were sanctioned, and twenty-six of the fifty had a low ice class (Ice3 or below) or none at all. Bellona adds that the route's administration has published nothing on incidents and accidents since 2025.14 Thirty-three of the fifty tankers are at least fifteen years old, which means more ageing, lightly strengthened ships are going through the ice while less is said about what happens to them.14

Russia's partners have a stake also. Rosatom owns 51% of an Arctic container logistics venture set up in 2023 with Dubai's DP World, which holds the remaining 49%.1 Chinese oil buyers and container lines can give Moscow business that Western sanctions struggle to access.

Britain has started to treat the High North as a front line. In January, Yvette Cooper, then Foreign Secretary, visited Finland and Norway, two members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and said: "As climate change opens the Arctic, the region will become an ever more critical frontier for NATO."15 At the Munich Security Conference in February, Sir Keir Starmer, then Prime Minister, said the carrier strike group led by HMS Prince of Wales would deploy to the North Atlantic and the High North this year.16 On 10th November, aboard the same carrier in Norway, the First Sea Lord, General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, signed the Northern Navies Initiative with representatives of all ten maritime nations of the Joint Expeditionary Force, committing their navies to common training standards and joint planning ahead of any crisis. "The threats we face are multiplying," he said.17

In April 2025 Anthony Heron had warned, in a guest commentary for the Royal United Services Institute, that the UK, "despite branding itself as the 'Arctic's nearest neighbour', risks becoming a spectator in a contest that directly impacts its security and economic resilience".18 On defence, at least, London now seems to be acting on that kind of warning.

The Fair Verdict

The best argument for the Arctic is the momentum. Transits have risen two years running, and CHNL thinks the 2026 total could approach 150 transits and more than 4.5 million tonnes of cargo.2 China's Ministry of Transport is rolling out 72-hour ice forecasts for the route from the Bering Strait to the Kara and Barents seas.6 If the ice keeps retreating and the forecasts improve, the season could lengthen and the risks could fall, and anyone tempted to dismiss the route outright should take that seriously.

Despite this, it is hard to see the Arctic rivalling Suez. The route is open for about four months a year, and major lines such as MSC refuse to use it. A transit can cost more than the Suez run, and every one passes through waters Russia controls. Boris Vergote, a senior manager at Systemiq, made the point plainly: "Shippers do not make decisions based on the average conditions."4 A single bad ice year, or a single sanctions decision in Moscow, could wipe out the saving.

The Arctic is a real trade route, but chiefly for Russia and China, which now have a working summer corridor for sanctioned oil and Chinese exports. For other shippers it is a seasonal fallback when the southern chokepoints are in trouble. For Britain, the stakes have less to do with trade than with security, because a trade route that grows more useful to Moscow and Beijing each year runs past NATO's northern flank.

Footnotes

  1. Enterprise, Arctic shipping hits a record as Hormuz and Bab Al Mandab get harder to rely on (opens in a new tab), 8th October 2026. 2 3

  2. gCaptain, Northern Sea Route Transits Surpass 2025 Total as Arctic Shipping Gains Momentum (opens in a new tab), 19th October 2026. 2 3

  3. TASS, Northern Sea Route transit reaches 6 mln tons in early November (opens in a new tab), 11th November 2026.

  4. ArcticToday, Arctic shipping brings shorter routes but few rewards, new research finds (opens in a new tab), 10th November 2026. 2 3

  5. Lloyd's List Intelligence, Strait of Hormuz Brief: 5 November, 2026 (opens in a new tab), 5th November 2026.

  6. ArcticToday, China's Arctic shipping moves from trial to schedule (opens in a new tab), 12th August 2026. 2

  7. gCaptain, China Completes First Season of Regular Arctic Container Service (opens in a new tab), 7th October 2026. 2 3

  8. The Barents Observer, Russian Arctic oil exports to China beat records (opens in a new tab), 4th September 2026.

  9. Lloyd's List Intelligence, Red Sea Brief - 1 October 2026 (opens in a new tab), 1st October 2026.

  10. Bellona, Arctic shipping expands as Chinese and Korean transit ambitions collide with chilly realities (opens in a new tab), 10th November 2026.

  11. gCaptain, MSC Chief Doubles Down on Arctic Shipping Ban as Chinese Operators Chart Record Growth (opens in a new tab), 30th January 2026.

  12. The Moscow Times, Russia's Northern Sea Route Cargo Volumes Fall for Second Straight Year (opens in a new tab), 9th February 2026.

  13. gCaptain, Russia Says Northern Sea Route Transit Cargo to Nearly Double in 2026 (opens in a new tab), 27th October 2026. 2

  14. gCaptain, Shadow Fleet Traffic on Northern Sea Route Surges as Arctic Safety Concerns Grow (opens in a new tab), 5th October 2026. 2

  15. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 'We must strengthen Arctic defences to deter Putin' Foreign Secretary says during Arctic visit (opens in a new tab), 14th January 2026.

  16. High North News, UK Signals Carrier Deployment to Arctic as Europe Doubles Down on High North Security (opens in a new tab), 16th February 2026.

  17. Forces News, Northern Navies: New agreement sees Royal Navy and JEF allies operate as one (opens in a new tab), 11th November 2026.

  18. Royal United Services Institute, Frozen Out: Why the UK Must Step Up in the Arctic (opens in a new tab), 15th April 2025.